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TRANSPARENCY AND COMPARATIVE EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY:  GLOBAL LESSONS FOR PARDON REFORM
IN THE UNITED STATES
Andrew Novak*
INTRODUCTION
Federal law enforcement and prosecution in the United States
expanded greatly over the course of the twentieth century, but pres-
idential clemency, one of the few explicit constitutional checks on
prosecutorial and police powers, has fallen into disuse over the last
thirty years.1 No category of cases has suffered the decline of clem-
ency more than death penalty cases; capital clemency at the federal
level has all but vanished.2 Today, the federal criminal justice sys-
tem has grown in size and scope due to expansive criminal laws,
overcrowded and expensive systems of incarceration, and the
debilitating collateral consequences of conviction that hinder an in-
dividual’s reintegration into society long after a sentence is served.3
* Andrew Novak, Adjunct Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society, George Mason
University. Ph.D. candidate, School of Law, Middlesex University London.
1. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 807–08, 815–17 (2015). Presidential clemency has declined considerably
over the course of American history. Between 1860 and 1900, nearly half of all applications
for presidential pardons were granted, though this was in a time before widespread pardon
and parole procedures and the development of special procedures for juveniles and persons
with mental illness. Kathleen Dean Moore, Mr. President, Misusing this Pardon Power is Un-
pardonable, 13 FED. SENT’G REP.  159, 159 (2000-2001). From Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency
through Jimmy Carter’s, more than 200 people each year received presidential clemency.
This number fell to only about 200 each term during Ronald Reagan’s presidency and only
77 in four years for George W. Bush. Id. at 159. This decline is especially precipitous with
federal death penalty cases, declining to the point of insignificance, especially with the aboli-
tion of the mandatory death penalty. See AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO
STOP AN EXECUTION 35 (2005); Dwight Aarons, Adjudicating Claims of Innocence for the Capitally
Condemned in Tennesssee: Embracing a Truth Forum, 76 TENN. L. REV. 511, 546 (2009); Michael
Heise, The Death of Death Row Clemency and the Evolving Politics of Unequal Grace, 66 ALA. L. REV.
951 (2015).
2. See Heise, supra note 1. From 1977 to 2009, 245 prisoners on death row received
clemency, which included the mass commutation of 167 commutations and four pardons by
then-Governor George Ryan of Illinois in 2003. Aarons, supra note 1, at 546. Only one of
those 280 grants of clemency was by the President of the United States for a prisoner on
federal death row: David Ronald Chandler in 2001 by then-President Bill Clinton for con-
cerns about innocence. Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/clemency#List (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).  Today, 62 persons are on federal death
row.  The U.S. federal government has only executed three people since 1963. Federal Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-pen
alty (last visted Dec. 12, 2015).
3. Barkow, supra note 1, at 808–09.
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The United States is not alone. The crisis of incarceration is a
global one.4 Increasing reliance on the president’s pardon power is
not a substitute for legislative reform, but it holds some promise to
mitigate the worst injustices. A legal system with a well-functioning
parole or probation system and judicial discretion to determine ap-
propriate sentences may make clemency superfluous, or at least
rare.5 In the United States, however, opportunities for federal pa-
role have declined and constraints on judicial discretion have
increased.6
The secretive and opaque nature of federal clemency in the
United States has contributed to perceptions that the pardon power
may be misused.7 Although the usual federal clemency process is
governed by Article II of the Constitution and by federal regula-
tions,8 the President and his administrative counterparts in the
Department of Justice have no obligation to provide reasons for a
denial of clemency, to seek the views of other stakeholders, includ-
ing victims, or to reveal aspects of the deliberative process.9 The
secrecy of the clemency process underscores a fundamental tension
4. See Roy Walmsley, Global Incarceration and Prison Trends, 3 F. ON CRIME & SOC. 65,
70–71 (2003) (discussing prison growth rates of varying degrees throughout the world, while
also noting some less statistically significant prison population decline in certain countries).
5. Prior to the establishment of modern parole, remissions, and probation systems in
the early twentieth century, conditional pardons served to shorten punishment and ensure
law-abiding behavior, but these required the executive branch to monitor persons receiving
conditional pardons to ensure compliance with the conditions. Harold J. Krent, Conditioning
the President’s Pardon Power, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1677–78 (2001). Parole, remissions, and
probation systems institutionalized the shortening of sentences for rehabilitative purposes,
ensuring application of consistent criteria and less erratic decision-making. Id. at 1678. But see
Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and Practice of Pardon-
ing, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 125–26 (2000–2001) (“Even after pardon’s role in the justice
system was largely taken over in the 1930s by parole and probation, and obviated by procedu-
ral improvements in the legal system, the practice of pardoning in the federal system
remained vital through the 1970s.”).
6. See Frank O. Bowman, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing System: A Structural Analysis,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1333–34, 1336–37 (2005) (describing the curtailment of judicial
sentencing discretion and the rise of prosecutorial discretion); David Robinson, The Decline
and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline Sentencing, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 881, 882 n.5, 890 (1996)
(describing restrictions on parole and sentence reductions).
7. See Margaret Colgate Love, Justice Department Administration of the President’s Pardon
Power: A Case Study in Institutional Conflict of Interest, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(“On the rare occasions when the public becomes aware of the way the pardon process oper-
ates, it confirms persistent myths about pardoning that are a long way from [Alexander]
Hamilton’s vision of the pardon power as an integral part of the constitutional scheme.”).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.35, 0.36.
9. Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clemency Decisions Be Subject to a Reasons Requirement?, 13 FED.
SENT’G REP. 151, 151–52 (2000–2001) (discussing the failure to provide reasons). See also
Cathleen Burnett, The Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R.
191, 203 (2003) (noting that there is “no constitutional right to clemency” as such and that
federal courts have refused to require that clemency decisions be made in accordance with
minimal due process standards).
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of the clemency power: is a pardon designed to be a rare and unan-
ticipated “act of grace,” an other-worldly charismatic power that
strikes like a lightning bolt? Or is it a routine bureaucratic decision
subject to constitutional due process and principles of administra-
tive law, predictable and reliant on explicit criteria?10 Although the
first conception of the clemency power has historical resonance,
the clemency decision-making process would benefit from applying
constitutional due process and equal protection principles to clem-
ency decisions and applying transparent and predictable
administrative criteria.  This in turn may help restore public confi-
dence in federal clemency.
The word “clemency” is an umbrella term encompassing the four
traditional forms of executive mercy at common law: pardons, re-
prieves, commutations of sentence, and remissions of fines and
forfeitures.  At common law, the sovereign had unlimited discretion
to replace one form of punishment with a lesser one or none at all.
A pardon is the full cancellation of a punishment, either freely or
conditionally.  A reprieve is a temporary delay or suspension of
punishment, while a commutation is substitution of a greater sen-
tence with a lesser one.11  Because the pardon is the broadest form
of clemency and encompasses the full range of executive power,
“clemency” and “pardon” will be used interchangeably, except in
the unusual circumstance where a specific constitution distin-
guishes between the pardon power and other forms of clemency.
The pardon power in the United States is uniquely positioned to
benefit from comparative perspectives because it descends directly
from English royal power.12 The U.S. Constitution states that the
president has the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Of-
fenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment,”
a power that has been expansively interpreted to allow individual or
group pardons before, during, or after trial, conditionally or abso-
lutely.13 Every common law country possesses a mechanism for
10. In sociological terms, reference to Max Weber’s distinction between charismatic and
bureaucratic legitimate authority is relevant to this question. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196–98, 245–52 (Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, trans., eds., 1946).
The transformation of the clemency power from a charismatic prerogative of the monarch to
a bureaucratic decision of a justice department or ministry parallels the power’s development
in the history of the common law.
11. S.E. Martin, Commutation of Prison Sentences: Practice, Promise, and Limitation, 29 CRIME
& DELINQ. 593, 594 (1983).
12. JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 27 (2009).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (citing Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866)).
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clemency outside of the judicial branch.14 Although most common
law executives have pardon powers that are more limited than those
of the U.S. president, many of these countries exercise that power
far more frequently than the United States does.15 An executive’s
power to grant clemency is subject to enormous variation and ex-
perimentation worldwide because all countries must wrestle with
clemency’s underlying tensions between unchecked discretion and
law; between individualization and arbitrariness; and between
mercy and justice.
The clemency power descends from the royal prerogative of
mercy, dating approximately to the early common law period.16
14. Globally, only a handful of countries have no provision for pardons or clemency at
all, including in death penalty cases. The People’s Republic of China has no clemency mech-
anism outside of the judicial branch, even for capital cases, which is out of compliance with
international law. Liu Renwen, Recent Reforms and Prospects in China, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 107, 118–20 (Roger
Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013). In civil law nations, the clemency power frequently encom-
passes an “amnesty” power. However, unlike the common law prerogative of mercy, civil law
amnesty is not universally accepted, especially where it is used to give impunity to human
rights violators. Leslie Elazar Sebba, Pardon and Amnesty: Juridical and Penological Aspects
i–iii (June 1975) (unpublished LL.D. Thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (on file with
the Senate of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem).
15. The majority rule in the Commonwealth is that an executive may only grant pardons
after conviction. See, e.g., BELIZE CONST. art. 52(1)(a); JAM. CONST. art. 90(1)(a); FIJI CONST.
art. 115(1)(a); GHANA CONST. art. 72(1)(a); SIERRA LEONE CONST. art. 63(1)(a); KENYA
CONST. art. 133(1)(a); TANZ. CONST. art. 45(1)(a); INDIA CONST. art. 72(1).  The clemency
and pardon power is frequently used in developing countries, especially those that lack mod-
ern mechanisms for probation and parole and where prison overcrowding is endemic.  In
these countries, mass grants of clemency may be issued on holidays and anniversaries, for
instance. ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE
317–18 (5th ed., 2015). Besides prohibiting advance pardons, many common law constitu-
tions outside of the United States contain additional limitations on the pardon power.  In
Nigeria, certain corruption offenses are excluded. NIGERIA CONST. sched. 5 art. 18.  In Malay-
sia, Malawi, and some Micronesian states, self-pardons by the executive are prohibited.
MALAWI CONST. art. 89(2)(b); MALAY. CONST. art. 42; CHUUK (MICR.) CONST. art. 6, § 2(a);
KOSRAE (MICR.) CONST. art. 5, § 10; YAP (MICR.) CONST. art. 6, § 6.  Courts-martial and some
military crimes are excluded in Falkland Islands and Uganda. FALKLAND IS. CONST. art.
71(2); UGANDA CONST. art. 121(6) (excluding from the pardon power convictions from field
courts martial during military operations).  The Malaysian constitution restricts pardon of
Islamic law offenses by secular state governors. MALAY. CONST. art. 42(10).  Some constitu-
tions prohibit pardons of offenses under international criminal law, pursuant to treaty.
MAURITIUS CONST. art. 75(7); SEY. CONST. art. 60(5); SWAZ. CONST. art. 78(6).
On the other hand, the United States is one of only a handful of constitutions that ex-
clude impeachment from the pardon power. LIBER. CONST. art. 59; MALAWI CONST. art.
89(2)(b); N. MARIANA IS. CONST. art. 3(9)(c); PALAU CONST. art. 8(7); TONGA CONST. art 37.
Forty out of forty-nine U.S. state constitutions, plus Puerto Rico, also prohibit pardons for
impeachment (Oregon does not have an impeachment mechanism in its constitution). AN-
DREW NOVAK, COMPARATIVE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARDON POWER AND
THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 103 (2015).
16. See David Caruso & Nicholas Crawford, The Executive Institution of Mercy in Australia:
The Case and Model for Reform, 37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 312, 314 (2014); Stanley Grupp, Some Historical
Aspects of the Pardon Power in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 52–53 (1963).
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Because of the overly harsh application of criminal law, particularly
the mandatory death penalty, clemency remained robust even dur-
ing parliamentary supremacy in England.17 The conditional pardon
also eased chronic labor shortages in the colonies as transportation
to a penal colony was offered in exchange for a pardon.18 After
1837 and the rise of the modern administrative state, the pardon
power was exercised on the monarch’s behalf by the Home Secre-
tary in England and Wales and later the Secretaries of State for
Scotland and Northern Ireland and the Colonial Secretary.19 The
royal prerogative of mercy was delegated to colonial governors, usu-
ally without interference from London.20 This diffusion of the
prerogative of mercy formed the basis of the constitutional pardon
power in the English-speaking world.
One of the most serious concerns about clemency in general is
the potential for self-dealing by an executive. This concern extends
to the United States, where the President’s pardon power is
broad.21  Although no U.S. president has pardoned himself, the
most controversial pardons were made outside the formal Depart-
ment of Justice review process: President Gerald Ford’s pardon of
Richard Nixon, President George H.W. Bush’s pardon of the offi-
cials involved in the Iran-Contra scandal, President Bill Clinton’s
pardon of Democratic Party donor Marc Rich, and President
George W. Bush’s commutation of sentence for Vice President Dick
Cheney’s Chief of Staff I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby.22 Because other
constitutional systems have wrestled with these same concerns
about executive self-dealing, a number of other countries’ constitu-
tions contain a range of constitutional provisions limiting or
modifying such powers. The constitution of Kenya, for instance,
prohibits pardons by lame-duck or outgoing executives.23 The Ma-
laysian constitution contains an elaborate provision establishing an
17. See David Plater & Sue Milne, The Capital Case of Sarah McGregor and Mary Malo-
ney in New South Wales in 1834: ‘Justice Is Due Even to Them,’ Paper Presented to the Legal
Histories of the British Empire Conference at 7 (July 2014); ANDREW NOVAK, THE GLOBAL
DECLINE OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLA-
TIVE REFORM IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN 5 (2014).
18. Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Pardon Power, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1671
(2001). MOORE, supra note 1 at 19.
19. A.T.H. Smith, The Prerogative of Mercy, the Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice, 1983
PUB. L. 398, 426–27.
20. Caruso & Crawford, supra note 16 at 314; Norman D. Lattin, The Pardoning Power in
Massachusetts, 11 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507–08 (1931); Krent, supra note 18 at 1672.
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. Lauren Schorr, Breaking Into the Pardon Power: Congress and the Office of the Pardon
Attorney, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1542–45 (2009).  Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the
President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 5, 5, 6 (2007–2008).
23. KENYA CONST. art. 134(1).
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alternative process for executive self-pardons or pardons for imme-
diate family members.24 Several other constitutions prohibit
pardons for corruption, impeachment, or abuse of political office.25
A comparative constitutional analysis of the mercy power reveals a
wide range of experimentation aimed at improving transparency,
preventing arbitrariness, and providing reasoned decision-making
in the executive clemency process.
The clemency process’s secrecy at common law allowed a harsh
sentence to be modified after sentencing without undermining the
deterrence value of the original sentence.26 In the modern world,
however, unchecked executive discretion and a decision-making
process entirely outside of public view risks political manipulation,
improper influence, and arbitrary results. Transparency and public
participation may improve the quality of clemency grants and pre-
vent arbitrary decision-making, which can in turn boost public
confidence in the process.27
This Article argues for transparency in the clemency process and
contends that the concept of clemency as a benign sovereign’s “act
of grace” is no longer appropriate in the modern world where exec-
utive action is subordinate to principles of constitutional due
process and administrative equity. Despite calls for federal clem-
ency reform in the United States,28 little comparative research
examines clemency elsewhere in the common law world. This Arti-
cle compares common law countries’ constitutional clemency
mechanisms designed to promote openness, public and victim par-
ticipation, and rational decision-making. In addition, this Article
proposes four reforms to the U.S. pardon system that other English-
speaking countries use, which will be explored in the four parts that
24. MALAY. CONST. 1993 art. 42(12).
25. The U.S. Constitution prohibits pardons for impeachment. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2
(the President shall “have the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
United States, except in cases of impeachment”). Other constitutions with impeachment ex-
ceptions include Liberia, Tonga, and Malawi. LIBER. CONST. art. 59; MALAWI CONST. art.
89(2)(b) (preventing the president from pardoning herself or the vice president in the case
of impeachment); TONGA CONST. 2010 art. 37 (replacing “maladministration” with “impeach-
ment”). Nigeria has a provision exempting corruption and economic crimes from the scope
of the pardon power where the sentence was handed down by the Code of Conduct Tribu-
nal. NIGERIA CONST. sched. 5, art. 18(7).
26. Anthony N. Doob, Punishment in Late-Twentieth-Century Canada: An Afterword, in
QUALITIES OF MERCY: JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, AND DISCRETION 166, 172–73 (Carolyn Strange
ed., 1996).
27. Noel Cox, The Gradual Curtailment of the Royal Prerogative, 25 DENNING L.J. 1, 12–13
(2012).
28. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED.
SENT’G REP. 153, 153-55 (2009); Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Pro-
cess: What the President Can Learn from the States, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 730, 730–31 (2012);
Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561 (2001).
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follow: implementing an open decision-making structure (Part I);
allowing judicial review of clemency decisions (Part II); applying
freedom of information laws and reporting and publication re-
quirements to clemency deliberations (Part III); and creating a role
for victims and communities in the decision-making process (Part
IV).
I. TOWARD AN OPEN DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE
The bureaucratic structure of the federal clemency process in
the United States contrasts with the more common committee
structure used in many U.S. states and smaller common law na-
tions.29 These mercy committees are typically independent from a
bureaucracy and are composed of experts on law, corrections,
medicine, or community relations, rather than political appointees.
By contrast, large jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, South
Africa, and India have bureaucratic systems in which a government
ministry controls the pardon application process.30  Although the
bureaucratic structure used in the United States and other large
jurisdictions may allow application of formal criteria and expedi-
tious handling of large numbers of cases, inefficient processing and
extensive delay, as in India, may affect the quality of the final rec-
ommendation.31 A committee structure, by contrast, benefits from
more actors being involved in the clemency process and resists
“capture” of the clemency mechanism by law enforcement or
prosecutorial interests. This Part will explore both models of clem-
ency decision-making and consider alternatives to the bureaucratic
procedure that currently prevails at the U.S. federal level.
The closed bureaucratic structure of the federal clemency pro-
cess in the United States is an obstacle to greater transparency and
public accountability. The Office of the Pardon Attorney originated
29. In the constitutions of the Commonwealth Caribbean, common law Africa, and
countries such as Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands, an open committee
structure prevails. See, e.g., ANT. & BARB. Const. art. 85; BOTS. CONST. art. 54; GREN. CONST.
art. 73; GUY. CONST. art. 189; MALAWI CONST. art. 89(2)(a); MALAY. CONST. art. 42; PAPUA N.G.
CONST. art. 152; SOLOM. IS. CONST. art. 45(2).
30. NOVAK, supra note 15 at 39–40, 143–44.
31. See ASIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ARBITRARY ON ALL COUNTS: CONSIDERATION OF
MERCY PLEAS BY THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA 12–24 (2014) (discussing failures of Home Ministry
to consult with proper trial records and Ministry’s concealment of relevant evidence); Poor-
nima Sampath & Priyadarshini Narayanan, Mercy Petitions: Inadequacies in Practice, 12 STUDENT
ADVOC. 72, 72–74 (2000) (discussing the notorious delays in processing a clemency petition
in India).
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from an Act of Congress in 1865 and is housed today in the Depart-
ment of Justice.32 The Code of Federal Regulations specifies the
process of application, review, and determination, and requires a
five-year waiting period after conviction to apply.33 After receiving
an application, the Pardon Attorney reviews the entire package and
makes a final recommendation to the President.34 As former Par-
don Attorney Margaret Colgate Love writes, the pardon power has
declined since 1980 in part because career prosecutors are in
charge of advising on clemency decisions.35 In recent years, Justice
Department officials have rubber-stamped the recommendations of
prosecutors without subjecting them to thorough review.36 Love re-
calls that by the time President Clinton entered office in 1993, the
pardon program had lost its independence and functioned prima-
rily to ratify the results achieved by prosecutors: “To be sure, the
pardon process was disciplined and regular. But it had no sense of
mission, and produced very little.”37 When President Clinton
granted pardons outside of this process at the end of his term, he
suffered a major political backlash.38 The combination of cautious,
politically-accountable officials and reluctance of civil servants in
the Department of Justice created an opaque, unaccountable struc-
ture that has contributed to the erosion federal clemency in the
United States. Other large jurisdictions besides the United States
face a similar challenge regarding law enforcement and
prosecutorial interests’ influence on the clemency process, the lack
of transparency in the deliberation process, and inefficient process-
ing of large numbers of petitions. In the United Kingdom, the
Home Office is politically responsible for law enforcement.39 If a
clemency petition requires a police investigation, the Home Office
is not able to second-guess the police.40 In India, the Ministry of
Home Affairs has resisted identifying clemency guidelines despite
32. Lauren Schorr, Breaking Into the Pardon Power: Congress and the Office of the Pardon
Attorney, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1535, 1542–43 (2009).
33. 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2015).
34. Jody C. Baumgartner & Mark H. Morris, Presidential Power Unbound: A Comparative
Look at Presidential Pardon Power, 29 POL. & POL’Y 209, 216 (2001).
35. Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last Pardons, 32 CAP.
U. L. REV. 185, 192–93 (2002).
36. Id.; see also H. Abbie Erler, Executive Clemency or Bureaucratic Discretion? Two Models of
the Pardon Process, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 427, 443 (2007).
37. Love, supra note 36 at 193.
38. Id. at 198–200; Erler, supra note 36, at 445 (noting that President Clinton lacked a
close relationship with his Attorney General).
39. See Smith, supra note 19 at 398, 430.
40. Id.
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accusations from human rights organizations that grants of clem-
ency are arbitrary.41 South Africa also has a bureaucratic mercy
process involving senior-level government officials.42 Like the presi-
dent of the United States, the South African president has full
power to pardon or reprieve offenders and to remit fines, penalties,
and forfeitures.43 The South African pardon policy has evolved to
require an application to the Department of Justice and Constitu-
tional Development, which considers the merits and provides a
recommendation to the president.44 The South African system,
however, is “cumbersome” and “not cost effective” given the in-
volvement of senior state officials in reviewing an increasing
number of relatively low-level matters.45 The burden on South Af-
rica’s pardon system is further compounded by poor or outdated
record keeping.46  At its best, a bureaucratic process can be orderly
and efficient. At its worst, it can be secretive, slow-moving, and
unaccountable.
An open committee structure has several advantages over the
closed bureaucratic systems in the United States and its counter-
parts in the United Kingdom, India, South Africa, and elsewhere.
This structure, which prevails in many smaller common law coun-
tries and most U.S. states, involves a constitutional framework in
which the executive must consult with the cabinet or executive
council, a general advisory body, or a specially-appointed advisory
mercy committee, all of which provide recommendations outside of
a formal bureaucracy, such as a justice ministry.47 Jurisdictions vary
on whether the committee’s advice is simply a recommendation or
whether it binds the executive.48 The makeup of the committee and
41. See ASIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 31 at 10.
42. B.C. Naudé, The Pardoning Power As a Duty of Justice, 15 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 159,
160–61 (2002).
43. S. AFR. CONST. art. 84(2)(j).
44. Naudé, supra note 42, at 160–61.
45. Id. at 171.
46. Id.
47. In Papua New Guinea, the governor-general must act on the advice of the National
Executive Council (the cabinet), which in turn receives advice from the Advisory Committee
on the Power of Mercy. PAPUA N.G. CONST. arts. 151–52. In Ghana, a general advisory body
known as the Council of State, akin to a council of elders, advises the president on the exer-
cise of many different executive powers, including the mercy power. GHANA CONST. art.
72(1). Zambia is illustrative of a host of constitutions where the president receives advice
directly from an advisory mercy committee. See ZAM. CONST. art. 94–95.
48. Lesotho’s constitution provides an example of a provision in which the committee’s
advice is binding on the executive: the King’s pardon power “shall be exercised by him acting
in accordance with the advice of the Pardons Committee.” LESOTHO CONST. art. 101(2).
Brunei Darussalam’s constitution provides an example of a provision in which the commit-
tee’s advice is nonbinding: “In exercising his powers, His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-
Pertuan may have regard to, but is not bound to act in accordance with, the advice of the
826 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:4
the terms and conditions of membership also differ. In some juris-
dictions, such as Florida, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka, the executive
is required to receive the advice or approval of at least one other
cabinet minister before granting clemency.49 In a number of South
Pacific nations, as well as Singapore, Zimbabwe, and Malta, the ex-
ecutive must consult with the entire cabinet,50 although the
executives in these jurisdictions are not bound by the committees’
advice.51 By contrast, in the Solomon Islands and eight U.S. states,
the executive holds the clemency power, but he or she may only
grant clemency upon a clemency committee or pardons board’s
favorable recommendation.52 Finally, in nine U.S. states, the clem-
ency power is vested exclusively in an executive board; in three of
these states (Nevada, Minnesota, and Nebraska), the governor sits
as a member of the board.53 Although these structures vary widely
Pardons Board.” BRUNEI CONST. art. 9(2) (suspended by Constitution of Brunei Darussalam
(Suspension) Order (2006)).
49. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 34(1) (requiring the president to consult with both the minis-
ter of justice and the attorney general).; FLA CONST. art. 4 § 8 (requiring the governor to
receive approval from two cabinet members); Denis Blundell, Some Reflections Upon the Office of
Governor-General in New Zealand, 10 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 197, 200 (1980).
50. See MALTA CONST. art. 93(2), ZIM. CONST. art. 112(1); MARSH. IS. CONST. art. 5, secs.
1(1), 3(f).  For Singapore, see SING. CONST. ART. 22P(1)-(2); Yong Vui Kong v. Att’y Gen.,
[2011] SGCA 9 (Sing.) (holding that the president is bound by the advice of the cabinet).
51. See, e.g., PAPUA N.G. CONST. arts. 151(1) (stating that the head of state may grant
pardons “acting with, and in accordance with, the advice of the National Executive Coun-
cil”), 152; MARSH. IS. CONST. art. 5 §§ 1(1), 3(f); ZIM. CONST. art. 112(1) (2013); MALTA
CONST. art. 93(2).  All these provisions require the executive to consult with the committee,
but do not require the executive to follow that advice.  The constitution of Saint Helena is
even more explicit, stating that the governor “shall exercise the powers conferred by this
section acting in his or her discretion, but after consulting the committee established by
section 30.” ST. HELENA CONST. art. 29(2). Compare TUVALU CONST. art. 80(1); KIRIBATI
CONST. art. 50 (stating that the governor must act “in accordance with the advice of the
Cabinet”). See id.  All of these provisions require the executive to consult with the committee,
but do not require the executive to follow that advice.  The constitution of Saint Helena is
even more explicit, stating that the governor “shall not exercise the powers conferred by this
section acting in his or her discretion, but after consulting the committee established by
section 30.” ST. HELENA CONST. art. 29(2).
52. SOLOM. IS. CONST. art. 45(5); ARIZ. CONST. art. 5 § 5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-401; DEL.
CONST. art. 7 § 1; IND. CONST. art. 5 § 17; IND. CODE § 11-9-2-1; LA. CONST. art. 4 § 5(E)(1);
OKLA. CONST. art. 6 § 10; PENN. CONST. art. 4 §9; TEX. CONST. art. 4 § 11(b).  Until a legisla-
tive change in 2015, the governor of Montana required a favorable recommendation from a
hearing panel appointed by the pardon board, except in death penalty cases.  H.R. 43 2015
Leg., 64th Sess. (Mont. 2015), amending MCA 46-23-301 (removing the phrase “In noncapi-
tal cases, if the hearing panel recommends that clemency be denied, the application may not
be forwarded to the governor and the governor may not take action on the case”).
53. ALA. CONST. art. 5, § 124 (amended 1939); CONN. CONST. art. 4, § 13; GA CONST. art.
4, § 2 para. 1; IDAHO CONST. art. 4, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. 5, § 7 (amended 1896); NEB.
CONST. art. 4, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 14 (1); UTAH CONST. art. 7, § 12; CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-124a; S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-920.
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in practice, they also possess core advantages. They may help pro-
vide consistency and institutional memory in the exercise of the
mercy power and, compared to a bureaucracy, may be resistant to
political influence.54
Another advantage of an open committee structure is that in-
cluding experts and nonpolitical actors in committee membership
may broaden the diversity of represented views. This prevents nar-
row interests or political forces from influencing the clemency
authority. Some constitutions frequently require that a legal actor,
such as a minister of justice or a corrections expert, be involved in
these committees.55 Other countries’ constitutions require a medi-
cal practitioner to evaluate the prisoner’s treatment and mental
health.56 The diverse membership of clemency committees reflects
a range of sentencing priorities across jurisdictions: an Islamic legal
authority in Brunei; a social worker in the Solomon Islands; a crime
victim in Pennsylvania or Colorado; a wrongfully convicted person
in Connecticut.57 The constitutions of Uganda, Kenya, Malaysia,
Guyana, and Lesotho variously exclude members of parliament,
lawyers, or other government officials in favor of members of civil
society.58
A nonpolitical selection process and terms of appointment for
members may improve decision-making. In some Commonwealth
Caribbean nations, the governor-general must consult with the
54. One objection to a committee structure is that it may be more conservative with
systematic or policy-driven grants of clemency compared to an executive acting alone. But see
Elizabeth Rapaport, The Georgia Immigration Pardons: A Case Study in Mass Clemency, 13 FED.
SENT’G REP. 184, 184–85 (2000–2001). Over a fifteen-month period in 2000 and 2001, the
Georgia Board of Pardons granted 138 pardons to permanent resident aliens who suddenly
found themselves subject to deportation due to a change in federal immigration laws. Discre-
tionary mercy authority allowed the Board to correct manifest injustice not otherwise subject
to redress, especially to misdemeanants who had lived in the U.S. for many years or had U.S.
citizen children. Id.
55. BOTS. CONST. art. 54(1)(b); UGANDA CONST. art. 121(1)(a); GUY. CONST. art. 189(b);
TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. art. 88(c); KENYA CONST. art. 133(2); PENN. CONST. art. 4 § 9(b).
56. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ART. 85(C); BOTS. CONST. ART. 54(1)(C); FALKLAND IS. CONST.
ART. 70(D); GRENADA CONST. ART. 73(C); PENN. CONST. ART. 4, § 9; SOLOM. IS. CONST. ART.
45(2)(A); ST. LUCIA CONST. ART. 75(1); SWAZI. CONST. ART. 78(2).
57. BRUNEI CONST. art. 8A, (suspended by Constitution of Brunei Darussalam (Suspen-
sion) Order (2006)); SOLOM. IS. CONST. art. 45(2)(a); PENN. CONST. art. 4, § 9 (amended
1997); Exec. Order No. B-008 (2007) (Colo.) (requiring one member to be a crime victim);
Jenny Wilson & Alaine Griffin, Malloy Appoints Man Wrongfully Convicted of Murder to Parole
Board, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 8, 2014, 8:35 PM), www.courant.com/politics/hc-malloy-
appointments-judges-board-20141008-story.html.
58. GUY. CONST. art. 189(2); KENYA CONST. art. 133(2); LESOTHO CONST. art. 102(1);
MALAY. CONST. art. 42(7); UGANDA CONST. art. 121(1)–(3).
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prime minister or opposition leader,59 while in Lesotho and Sey-
chelles, appointments are vetted through a judicial appointments
authority.60 In Sierra Leone, the cabinet, not the president, ap-
points the committee.61 Gambia and the U.S. states of Georgia and
Utah require legislative approval of appointees.62 Term limits for
members are also common: four years in Uganda, three years in
Malaysia, Belize, and Guyana, and two years in Fiji.63
Research from the United States suggests that an impartial com-
mittee, operating under regulated procedures and insulated from
politics, is more likely to grant routine pardons than an elected offi-
cial acting alone.64 According to former U.S. Pardon Attorney
Margaret Colgate Love’s statistics, the most frequent clemency
grants occur in states with independent pardons boards (such as
Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, and South Carolina).65 States
where a governor requires a recommendation from a board to
grant clemency, called a hybrid model, have more mixed results:
some states frequently grant clemency while others do not.66 Even
in states where governors possess final clemency power, governors
frequently consult with an appointed board on the assumption that
it is politically safer.67 For example, former Illinois Governor Pat
Quinn, who frequently granted clemency, often consulted with his
state’s Prisoner Review Board.68 In Maryland, Michigan, and Mis-
souri the parole board is required by statute to review all clemency
petitions and make non-binding recommendations.69 Even in juris-
dictions where such a board does not exist, governors have found it
politically expedient to create one.  By executive order in 2007, the
governor of Colorado established a seven member Executive Clem-
ency Advisory Board to make recommendations on mercy at the
governor’s request.70
59. ANT. & BARB. CONST. art. 85(a)-(d); DOMINICA CONST. art. 74(1)–(2); GREN. CONST.
art. 73(1)–(5).
60. LESOTHO CONST. art. 102; SEY. CONST. art. 61.
61. SIERRA LEONE CONST. art. 63(1).
62. GAM. CONST. art. 82(2); GA. CONST. art. 4 § 2; UTAH CONST. art. 7 § 12(1).
63. BELIZE CONST. art. 54 (amended 1988); FIJI CONST. arts. 115(2)–(3), 169(k), 170(2),
183(1)(1), 183(2); GUY. CONST. art. 189(3); MALAY. CONST. art. 42(4)–(11); UGANDA CONST.
art. 121(1)–(3).




68. See Id. at 749.
69. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.244 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.800; MD. REGS. CODE tit.
12 § 18.01.16.
70. Exec. Order B-008 (2007) (Colo.).
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The implementation of a committee structure at the federal level
to consider clemency requests could benefit the routine clemency
process in several ways. First, the committee structure would bring a
diverse range of views to bear on a clemency petition and could
resist capture by prosecutorial or law enforcement interests. Exper-
tise from medical practitioners, justice reform advocates, and
others would improve the caliber of the clemency recommendation
and preserve the independence of the committee members from
organizational pressures. Second, as the experience of states shows,
committees frequently improve the transparency of the clemency
process through open deliberations, access to stakeholders such as
victims, families, and local officials, and public reporting and re-
cord-keeping. A number of federal agencies incorporate the advice
or deliberations of independent boards or committees into their
routine operations precisely to take advantage of outside expertise
and diversity of viewpoint.71 The Department of Justice could bene-
fit from the diversity of views a committee structure would provide,
even if such a committee provided only non-binding
recommendations.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
The United States has not followed the international trend to-
ward increasingly robust judicial review of the clemency and
pardon power. Judicial review ensures the executive branch follows
established legal processes and protects the due process rights of
applicants. These due process rights include assurances that an ap-
plicant has the right to seek clemency, that consideration of the
petition is timely and in good faith, that the deliberation process is
genuine and free from conflicts of interest, and that an applicant
will not be executed while a petition is still pending.72 In many
71. See generally Stephen P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act
and Good Governance, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 452–53 (1997) (explaining how the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, which regulates external advisory policy boards of federal executive
agencies, was intended to promote openness, impartiality, and administrative efficiency).
72. These rights are among the minimum standards required by international law in
death penalty cases. See United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), art. 6, ¶ 49, draft general comment No. 36 CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.2 (Sept. 2,
2015) (“pardon or commutation procedures must offer certain essential guarantees, includ-
ing clarity about the processes followed and the substantive criteria applied; a right for
individuals sentenced to death to initiate pardon or commutation procedures and to make
representations about their personal or other relevant circumstances; a right to be informed
in advanced when the request will be considered; and a right to be informed promptly about
the outcome of the procedure”).
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countries, the clemency process is becoming subordinated to prin-
ciples of constitutional and administrative law; this contrasts with
clemency’s origins as an unreviewable prerogative power of the En-
glish monarch.73 Judges are increasingly willing to evaluate pardons
to determine whether the constitutional mercy procedure is fol-
lowed. Judicial review also ensures that a defendant is provided
minimal due process protections and that a grant of clemency is
not arbitrary or discriminatory, although judges typically stop short
of reviewing the ultimate pardon decision. Opening the clemency
process to judicial scrutiny is one means of increasing transparency
and ensuring that an applicant’s due process rights are protected,
especially in death penalty cases.
Judicial oversight of clemency in the United States is extremely
minimal, even though the right to seek clemency in death penalty
cases is required by international law.74 The U.S. Supreme Court
has considered the constitutionality of state clemency proceedings
based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, the Court held that a clem-
ency applicant has no constitutionally-protected interest in non-
capital clemency proceedings; therefore, the Due Process Clause
imposes no limitations on the executive.75 In 1998, the Court ad-
dressed the constitutional standards of clemency in capital cases in
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, a plurality decision.76 Because
she provided the crucial fifth vote, the narrow concurring opinion
of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor is recognized as controlling.77 Jus-
tice O’Connor concluded that “some minimal procedural
safeguards apply to clemency proceedings” because a death row
prisoner has an interest in his or her life and judicial intervention
might be warranted where, for instance, a state official merely
flipped a coin.78 In dissent, Justice Stevens cited a broader list of
constitutionally troublesome circumstances, including instances of
73. See Cox, supra note 27, at 12–13.
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 6(4), opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  The United
States has ratified the ICCPR.
75. See Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat 452 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1981).
76. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
77. Although the Court ruled 8-1 to uphold the Ohio provisions as constitutional, five
justices (O’Connor’s concurrence, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
and Stephen Breyer, and the dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens) supported the proposition
that a prisoner under a death sentence has a constitutional interest in protecting his right to
life and therefore some minimal constitutional safeguards were required. Id. at 288
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  The dissent by Justice Stevens supported more robust constitu-
tional protections. Id. at 290–91 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 274, 288. (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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bribery, personal or political animosity, or fabrication of false evi-
dence, that implicated broader Due Process concerns than those
protected under Justice O’Connor’s rationale.79 The Court rejected
the clemency applicant’s argument that the Ohio clemency author-
ity provided insufficient notice for a clemency hearing and did not
offer assurances that the applicant’s counsel could attend and par-
ticipate in proceedings.80
Woodard provides only the most minimal protections for clem-
ency applicants and is out of sync with a growing consensus in the
English-speaking world. Woodard applies only in death penalty cases
and prevents only the most egregious and wanton conduct. One of
the rare cases where clemency proceedings were found to violate
due process was Young v. Hayes, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit found a city attorney’s threat to fire a lawyer
under her supervision if the lawyer provided information to the
governor or the parole board concerning a death row inmate’s
clemency petition was akin to the fortuitousness that Justice
O’Connor identified as the due process standard in clemency
cases.81 The lawyer had concerns about the quality of the inmate’s
counsel, but was under pressure not to embarrass the city attorney’s
office.82 The Eighth Circuit ruled in favor of the inmate, holding
that the Due Process Clause prevented state officials from frustrat-
ing a clemency petition by threatening the job of a potential
witness.83 Except for the most obvious conflicts of interest, as in
Young v. Hayes, Woodard has been interpreted to provide virtually no
due process protections in state clemency proceedings, even in cap-
ital cases.  In 1998, relying on Woodard, the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas upheld Texas clemency proceedings
even though the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles rarely met to
discuss any petitions for clemency and its members were allowed to
meet in private, or by telephone, and were allowed to call or fax in
their votes.84 The Board did not keep records of meetings and
never conducted an investigation or held a hearing. Yet the Board
must favorably recommend clemency before the governor can even
79. Id. at 290–91 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. See id. at 277.
81. See Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000).
82. Id. at 852.
83. Id. at 853.
84. Faulder v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344–5 (5th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam).
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consider the merits of a case.85 As it has been interpreted, the U.S.
Constitution places few limitations on the clemency process.86
The rise of judicial review in clemency cases elsewhere in the
common law world provides important comparisons for the U.S.
federal process. In many countries, the unlimited discretion of the
executive in granting clemency has yielded to judicial review in at
least some cases.87 Under the traditional conception of the preroga-
tive of mercy, courts could determine the existence and extent of
the royal prerogative of mercy but could not review the manner of
its exercise.88 As summarized by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in De Freitas v. Benny, mercy “is not the subject of legal
rights. It begins where legal rights end.”89 Beginning in the 1980s,
however, judicial un-reviewability of other royal prerogative powers
came under increasing scrutiny. In Council of Civil Service Unions
(CCSU) v. Minister for the Civil Service, a majority of the Law Lords in
the English House of Lords found that royal prerogative powers (in
that case, the royal Order-in-Council prerogative) were subject to
judicial review on administrative law grounds.90 Although the royal
prerogative of mercy was not originally included in the category of
royal prerogative powers subject to judicial review, the Queen’s
Bench for England and Wales determined in 1992 that the Home
Secretary had not given adequate consideration to the posthumous
mercy petition of Derek Bentley, who was hanged in 1953 for a
crime committed at age 19.91 Ex Parte Bentley established the pro-
position that the common law prerogative of mercy could be
85. See id.; Daniel T. Kobil, Chance and the Constitution in Capital Clemency Cases, 28 CAP.
U. L. REV. 567, 576 (2000); Allen L. Williamson, Clemency in Texas: A Question of Mercy?, 6 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 131, 148–49 (1999).
86. One major constitutional constraint is that an exercise of the clemency power can-
not violate other constitutional rights, such as equal protection, or infringe on the powers of
other branches of government.  Hoffstadt, supra note 28, at 594–95 (noting that grants of
clemency probably cannot interfere with the vested property rights of a third party in viola-
tion of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or require the payment of funds from the
U.S. Treasury in violation of the Taxing and Spending Clause); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the
Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85,
116 (2002) (noting that a pardon probably cannot violate equal protection).
87. The majority rule in the Commonwealth is that a court can inquire into whether the
executive properly considered a clemency petition, but not review the substance of the final
decision. NOVAK, supra note 30, at 194.
88. Smith, supra note 1939, at 432–33.
89. De Freitas v. Benny [1976] AC 239 (PC) 247 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
90. Council for Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374
(HL) at 375 (appeal taken from Eng.).
91. Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Ex parte Bentley) [1994] QB
349 (Eng.).
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subject to judicial review where the executive decision-maker did
not properly consider a clemency petition.92
A number of Commonwealth countries followed the opening es-
tablished by the House of Lords in CCSU. In New Zealand, the
Court of Appeal held in Burt v. Governor General that the prerogative
of mercy could be subject to judicial review in exceptional circum-
stances.93 In 2000, the Privy Council reversed De Freitas v. Benny and
a number of later cases in Lewis v. Attorney General of Jamaica.94 Ac-
cording to the Privy Council, the exercise of mercy was reserved for
the governor acting on the recommendations of the advisory mercy
committee and the merits were not for review in court. However,
the court could inquire into whether the governor general con-
sulted with the committee, whether the committee refused to look
at the required information, or whether the recommendation was
made by people unqualified to sit as members of the committee.95
Lewis has been favorably cited by the Caribbean Court of Justice,
the Hong Kong Court of First Instance, the Supreme Court of the
Australian Capital Territory, and the Queen’s Bench of Northern
Ireland.96 Canadian and South African jurisprudence are also in ac-
cord regarding the reviewability of pardons.97 Applying judicial
review to aspects of the mercy process represents an emerging con-
sensus in the Commonwealth and makes a clean break with the
historical conception of the King’s mercy as a divine act of
providence.
The global trend toward opening the mercy power to judicial re-
view is also occurring in countries where, like the United States, the
pardon power derives from a written constitution rather than com-
mon law conventions. Compared to the United States, India has
enacted more robust judicial review over clemency matters, a prod-
uct of perpetual tension between the executive branch and the
92. Id.
93. Christopher Gelber, Reckley (No 2) and the Prerogative of Mercy: Act of Grace or Constitu-
tional Safeguard?, 60 MOD. L. REV. 572 1997.
94. Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of Jam., [2000] PC 35 (appeal taken from Jam.).
95. Id. at ¶ 47.
96. See Att’y Gen. v. Joseph, [2006] CCJ 1 (AJ) at ¶ 132; Ch’ng Poh v. Chief Exec. of H.K.
Special Admin. Region, [2003] H.K.L.R.D. 496 at ¶¶ 31–32 (C.F.I.); Eastman v A-G (ACT)
[2007] CLR 28 at ¶¶ 49–50, 68–70 (Austl.); In re Dunn, [2010] NIQB 54 at ¶¶ 8–9, 18–19.
97. The Constitutional Court of South Africa has held that the presidential pardon
power “entails a corresponding right to have a pardon application considered and decided
upon rationally, in good faith, in accordance with the principle of legality, diligently and
without delay.” Minister of Justice v. Chonco, (2010) 1 SACR 325 (CC) at ¶ 30. The Canadian
Supreme Court has similarly ruled that the minister of justice “must act in good faith and
conduct a meaningful review” in a petition for clemency as he was bound by the duty of
fairness under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms even though he had no legal
obligations to an applicant. Thatcher v. Att’y Gen., [1997] 1 F.C. 289 (Can.).
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judicial branch on issues concerning the death penalty. Under the
constitution of India, “No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to a procedure established by
law.”98 In the seminal case Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the Su-
preme Court of India ruled that the prescribed procedure had to
be “fair, just, and reasonable,” importing principles of due process
into the clause.99 The Court applied this rule to clemency proceed-
ings in Maru Ram v. Union of India and ruled that it could review
grants of clemency that were “wholly irrelevant, irrational, discrimi-
natory, or mala fide.”100 In a subsequent decision, the Court
established that it could review executive clemency decisions for
procedural impropriety and violations of individual rights, but
could not review the substantive merits.101 The Court has, at times,
been vigilant about procedural delay in disposing of clemency peti-
tions.102 In addition, the Court has quashed state clemency orders
with a direction to reconsider the petition when, for instance, irrel-
evant considerations entered into the decision-making process or a
state governor made a mechanical decision.103 Undoubtedly, this
constitutional regime provides more robust oversight than that of
Woodard.
By contrast, a dwindling number of common law jurisdictions re-
sist judicial review of clemency deliberations. Singapore’s Court of
Appeal has constructed a model of judicial review of the clemency
power that is similar to that of the United States under Woodard. In
Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney General, the court ruled that exercise of the
pardon power was governed by the fundamental rules of natural
justice and was therefore reviewable on the classic grounds of ille-
gality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.104 However, the
Court found that the petitioner did not have the right to file a clem-
ency petition, the right to be heard, or, rejecting Lewis, the right to
see material presented to the cabinet.105 Other jurisdictions that ad-
here to a more traditional conception of judicial review of
98. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
99. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 658.
100. Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 at ¶ 9.
101. See Kehar Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 653, 664.
102. See, e.g., Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 SCC 68; Triveniben v. State
of Gujurat, (1989) 1 SCC 678.
103. See, e.g., Satpal v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 170; Epuru Sudhakar v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 385.
104. Yong Vui Kong v. Att’y Gen., [2011] SGCA 9.
105. Id.
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clemency decisions include Swaziland and Malaysia, where the pre-
rogative of mercy has been determined to be non-justiciable.106
These countries are increasingly in the minority and all three of
them have constitutional regimes that differ considerably from the
individual due process protections in the U.S. Constitution.107 The
United States stands apart from an emerging consensus on judicial
reviewability of clemency proceedings.
Opening the common law prerogative of mercy to judicial review
helps protect the rights of defendants and ensures that a clemency
authority follows constitutional requirements for the consideration
of petitions.  The United States, however, has resisted this trend.
Woodard provides only the most minimal due process protections
for clemency petitions and only in death penalty cases.108  Not only
is this stance out of sync with the growing majority rule in the com-
mon law world, such minimal due process protections may not be
compliant with international law, which requires an effective clem-
ency mechanism and genuine consideration process in every death
penalty case.109  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) scrutinized
American clemency proceedings in Avena and Other Mexican Nation-
als (Mexico v. United States of America) in its decision that the United
States violated the consular notification rights of Mexican nationals
on death row in Texas.110  According to the ICJ, while clemency
could provide an appropriate remedy for redressing due process
violations, the actual practice of clemency in the United States was
“not sufficient in itself” to comply with the United States’s obliga-
tions toward death row inmates.111  Increasing judicial scrutiny of
106. Nkosi v. Att’y Gen., [2004] SZHC 79 (June 17, 2004); Juraimi bin Husin v. Lembaga
Pengampuanan Negeri Pahang, [2001] 3 M.L.J. 458.
107. The constitutions of Malaysia and Singapore lack protection of a right to a fair trial
and a prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. See generally MALAY. CONST.
arts. 5–13 (detailing the fundamental rights provisions of both constitutions); SING. CONST.
arts. 9–16. In addition, both Singapore and Malaysia have constitutional systems that estab-
lish strong executives with relatively weak judicial power, a law and order ethos, and a general
intolerance of political dissent. See DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE NEXT
FRONTIER: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN ASIA 413
(2009). Similarly, Swaziland’s constitution fails to protect political freedoms or limit the
power of the monarchy, though the 2005 constitution provides an elaborate Bill of Rights. See
Sabelo Gumedze, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Swaziland, 5 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 266,
276 (2005); Chris Maroleng, Swaziland: The King’s Constitution, 12(3) AFR. SECURITY REV. 45,
47 (2003).  Charles Manga Fombad, The Swaziland Constitution of 2005: Can Absolutism Be Rec-
onciled with Modern Constitutionalism?, 23 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 93, 111 (2007).
108. See supra notes 7480 and accompanying text.
109. See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 15, at 312–13.
110. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 58, ¶¶
142–143 (Mar. 31).
111. Id.
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the clemency process and ensuring more robust due process pro-
tections for clemency applicants would accord with an emerging
global trend and ensure compliance with international minimum
standards.
III. TRANSPARENCY
In addition to constitutional doctrine, principles of administra-
tive law, including freedom of information laws and reporting and
publication requirements, have increasingly been applied to clem-
ency proceedings. In contrast to the minimal constitutional
standards imposed on the federal clemency process in the United
States, the Pardon Attorney’s deliberations have slowly opened to
administrative scrutiny under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) over the last decade. This is a positive development.
In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit applied FOIA to the U.S. Pardon Attorney in Judicial Watch,
Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice.112  In that case, a public interest judi-
cial watchdog organization requested documents related to
President Clinton’s pardon requests. The Justice Department under
President Bush invoked the presidential communications privilege
under FOIA Exemption 5, which protects “inter-agency or intra
agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”113
The Justice Department argued that the Pardon Attorney’s “sole”
responsibility was to advise the President on pardon applications,
and therefore the presidential communications privilege should ap-
ply to all pardon-related documents, or at least that the President’s
exercise of a “quintessential and non-delegable power” such as the
pardon power should be protected under executive privileges as a
general matter.114 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that the
presidential communications privilege only applies to those pardon
documents actually solicited and received by the President or his
immediate White House advisors.115 Because the Pardon Attorney’s
advice is filtered through the deputy attorney general, a privilege
rule encompassing the Pardon Attorney would sweep much of the
112. 365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
113. Chad T. Marriott, A Four-Step Inquiry to Guide Judicial Review of Executive Privilege Dis-
putes Between the Political Branches, 87 OR. L. REV. 259, 283 (2008) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
(2006)).
114. Marriott, supra note 1133, at 284.
115. Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1123.
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executive branch under the privilege.116 Today, the Pardon Attor-
ney receives FOIA requests as a matter of course, indicating that the
office “maintains a clemency case file for each individual who has
applied for or has been granted or denied clemency.”117 FOIA
makes these files reviewable, along with historical records and pub-
lic correspondence.118
Opening executive clemency to public scrutiny through adminis-
trative freedom of information laws has also occurred in other
common law jurisdictions. Australia is a notable example. In 2005,
the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of the state of Victoria or-
dered that clemency documents must be released under Victoria’s
Freedom of Information Act of 1982 in Osland v. Victorian Depart-
ment of Justice.119 In that case, new evidence came to light strongly
suggesting that Heather Osland, the petitioner, acted in self-de-
fense when she killed her husband. Her clemency application was
denied. The tribunal found that the public interest favored such a
release, given high media interest and lack of public confidence in
the decision.120 Victoria’s FOIA law protected from disclosure docu-
ments that “would be privileged from production in legal
proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege,” akin to
the work-product doctrine in the United States.121 Using the exam-
ples of President Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon and
President Bill Clinton’s pardon of Democratic Party donor Marc
Rich, the judge concluded that the “exercise of the prerogative of
mercy – or the grant of a pardon – in circumstances which are not
transparent or beyond question have the potential to undermine
public confidence in the justice system.”122
Adhering to the traditional conception of clemency as unreview-
able in court, a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court of Victoria
reversed, holding that the matter did not implicate a broader pub-
lic interest as a matter of law and that the documents remained
privileged.123 According to one of the concurrences:
116. Id. at 1122
117. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARDON ATTORNEY FOIA, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/
pardon-attorney-foia (last accessed August 20, 2015).
118. Id.
119. [2005] VCAT 1648 (Austl.).
120. Id. at ¶¶ 48–55.
121. Freedom of Information Act of 1982 (Vic) Sec 32(1) (Austl).
122. Osland [2005] VCAT 1648 at ¶ 49 (Austl.).
123. Sec’y to the Dep’t of Justice v Osland [2007] VSCA 96 at ¶ 103 (Austl.).
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Whether the prerogative is exercised or not is entirely within
the province of the Sovereign advised by the executive govern-
ment. No question of legal rights is involved. No reasons need
be given for the decision taken. . . . The decision itself is not
reviewable, nor are the reasons, motives, or intentions of the
Crown’s representative. Why then should the advice the Attor-
ney-General received before advising the Crown’s
representative to deny the petition be placed in the public
domain?124
The Australian High Court remitted the case back to the Supreme
Court of Victoria to actually inspect the documents to determine
whether the public interest would be served, emphasizing that Vic-
toria’s FOIA law contained a “public interest override” in which
documents otherwise exempt from disclosure could be disclosed
where the public interest so requires.125 However, the Supreme
Court of Victoria again unanimously ruled that the public interest
override could not apply since clemency was a non-reviewable and
discretionary act of the executive.126 On appeal, the Australian High
Court reversed and reinstated the Tribunal’s original decision
granting access to the documents. According to the High Court,
“exercise of the prerogative of mercy in relation to a person con-
victed of murder engages the public interest at a high level of
importance,” and a decision against exercise of the prerogative in
such a case involves “considerations of fundamental importance to
the whole community.”127
Both the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Judicial Watch and the Austra-
lian High Court’s decision in Osland have created important new
opportunities for academics, journalists, the general public, and the
applicants themselves to scrutinize the bureaucratic and otherwise
opaque clemency process.  The decisions in the United States and
Australia may herald a trend toward applying principles of adminis-
trative law to clemency proceedings, which, like applying
constitutional due process protections to such proceedings, can
help improve the quality of the clemency process.
Transparency in the clemency process can prevent arbitrariness,
discrimination, and political favoritism by allowing media and pub-
lic scrutiny and allowing applicants to challenge deficiencies.
124. Osland v Sec’y to the Dep’t of Justice [2008] HCA 37 at ¶ 43 (Bongiorno AJA, concur-
ring) (Austl.).
125. Id.
126. Sec’y to the Dep’t of Justice v Osland [No. 2] [2009] VSCA 69 (Austl.); (2009) 254 ALR
590.
127. Osland v. Sec’y to the Dep’t of Justice [2010] HCA 24 at ¶ 47.
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Application of freedom of information laws is one mechanism for
improving transparency; provision for written or oral representa-
tions and reporting and publication requirements are others.
Unlike state constitutions or the constitutions of other common law
jurisdictions, the U.S. constitution provides no reporting or publi-
cation requirements to inform the public, the victim, or even the
applicant of the timing, nature, or result of a clemency determina-
tion. Under federal regulations, a clemency applicant receives
notice of a clemency determination, but a provision for an oral
hearing through counsel is only permitted at the discretion of the
Pardon Attorney and only in federal death penalty cases.128 This
Part suggests some additional constitutional participation, report-
ing, and publication mechanisms used in other jurisdictions that
permit public and judicial scrutiny and that could improve public
perceptions of the pardon process.
One of the most common constitutional mercy provisions in the
Commonwealth requires that the trial judge (or the chief justice if
the trial judge is unavailable) provide a written report to the clem-
ency decision-maker in death penalty cases, a codification of the
British colonial practice.129 Twenty-three common law jurisdictions
require a mercy report in capital cases.130 The constitutions of
Uganda and Botswana are illustrative of the general provision in
which a trial judge or the chief justice must provide a written report
in all capital cases to the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of
Mercy.131 Other constitutions have more substantial requirements.
In Sierra Leone, a medical report on the prisoner is also required
in addition to the trial judge’s report.132 The constitution of Singa-
pore requires not only a report from the trial judge, but also
128. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.6–1.10.
129. For more on mercy reports in death penalty cases during the British colonial period,
see HELEN LACEY, ROYAL PARDON: ACCESS TO MERCY IN FOURTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 21
(2009) (discussing the role of reports from the trial judge to the chancellor in medieval
England); B.v.D. van Niekerk, . . . Hanged By the Neck Until You Are Dead, 86 S. AFR. L.J. 457,
460–61 (1969) (discussing the role of the mercy report in South Africa); Kenneth L. Avio,
The Quality of Mercy: Exercise of the Royal Prerogative in Canada, 13 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 366, 368
(1987) (discussing the role of the mercy report in Canada).
130. ANT. & BARB. CONST. art. 86(1); BAH. CONST. art. 92(1); BARB. CONST. art. 78(3);
BELIZE CONST. art. 53; BOTS. CONST. art. 55(1); DOMINICA CONST. art. 75; FIJI CONST. art.
115(4); GHANA CONST. art. 72(2); GREN. CONST. art. 74(1); GUY. CONST. art. 190(1); JAM.
CONST. art. 91(1); MALTA CONST. art. 93(2)(a); MAURITIUS CONST. art. 75(6); SIERRA LEONE
CONST. art. 63(2); SING. CONST. art. 22P(2); SOLOM. IS. CONST. art. 45(7); SRI LANKA CONST.
art. 34; ST. KITTS & NEVIS CONST. art. 68(1); ST. LUCIA CONST. art. 76; ST. VINCENT CONST. art.
67(1); SWAZ. CONST. art. 78(5); TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. art. 89(1); UGANDA CONST. art.
121(5).
131. BOTS. CONST. art. 55; UGANDA CONST. art. 121(5).
132. SIERRA LEONE CONST. art. 63(2).
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reports by the appellate judges that affirmed the sentences.133 In
Canada, before the abolition of the death penalty, the Remissions
Service of the Department of Justice gathered court records, the
trial judge’s report, representations on behalf of the accused, psy-
chiatric reports, and police reports in preparation for consultation
between the Director of the Remissions Service and either the min-
ister of justice or the solicitor general, who then consulted with the
cabinet.134 The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, imposes no particular
requirements as to the documentation on which the clemency au-
thority must rely.135
Jurisdictions vary as to whether an applicant for clemency is enti-
tled to an oral hearing or the right to make written representations
to a clemency authority,136 but such provisions undoubtedly im-
prove the quality of the deliberations. Federal regulations in the
United States provide a procedure by which clemency applicants
can request a hearing before the Office of the Pardon Attorney;
victims may also participate in the hearing.137  However, these provi-
sions are not legally binding and are only applicable to death
penalty cases.138  Nonetheless, four U.S. state constitutions (Idaho,
Utah, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) specifically provide for a public
hearing for clemency petitions.139 A total of twenty-four U.S. states
expressly permit hearings for pardon applicants; in eleven of them,
the hearings may be ex parte, and in ten the applicant’s presence is
required.140 Clemency hearings tend not to be directly adversarial,
and the applicant and other interested parties may testify in the
narrative rather than in a question-and-answer format.141 In Louisi-
ana, the pardon board even travels to prisons so that current
inmates can appear.142 Outside of the United States, oral hearings
133. SING. CONST. art. 22P(2).
134. Avio, supra note 129, at 367–68.
135. The U.S. Constitution provides no procedure for the exercise of the president’s
clemency power at all. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
136. According to Hood and Hoyle, Tanzania and Trinidad and Tobago allow the appli-
cant to make written representations to the mercy committee. Kenya does not. HOOD &
HOYLE, supra note 15 at 316.
137. 20 C.F.R. § 1.10(c).
138. Id. at § 1.10(c), 1.11.
139. DEL. CONST. art. 7 § 1(1); IDAHO CONST. art. 4 § 7; PENN. CONST. art. 4 § 9(a); UTAH
CONST. art. 7 § 12.
140. Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerthe, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice: Interpreta-
tions from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 413, 446 (1999).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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for clemency applications are unusual.143 More common are provi-
sions specifically allowing the petitioner and his or her
representative to make written representations to the deliberating
mercy committee.144 The applicant is also notified of the time of the
clemency deliberations and the final determination.145 The consti-
tution of Barbados, for instance, gives an applicant the right to
submit written representations to the Governor General or the advi-
sory mercy committee (known as the Barbados Privy Council) with
respect to any of their functions, but the applicant “is not entitled
to an oral hearing.”146  Nonetheless, a constitutional requirement
that an applicant has the right to make representations to the clem-
ency committee either personally or through legal counsel helps
ensure that the deliberation process will be genuine and may pre-
vent clemency decisions that are arbitrary, secretive, or
discriminatory.
Reporting and publication requirements also help improve trans-
parency in the mercy process, in particular by preventing secret
pardons. The constitution of Belize has a clause typical of this type,
authorizing an annual report to the prime minister that is subject to
consideration by the National Assembly.147 The new constitution of
Zimbabwe similarly allows for transparency through reporting; the
Zimbabwe constitution states that all clemency grants must be pub-
lished in the official government gazette, a provision that did not
exist in the previous constitution.148 Some national constitutions
even require that the executive provide reasons for a pardon. In
Tuvalu, if the governor-general exercises the mercy power, the
prime minister must present a statement giving reasons for the
grant at the next session of parliament.149 In the U.S., twenty-seven
states require that the governor report his or her clemency actions
to the state legislature.150 In addition, seven states require that a
143. I am not aware of any non-U.S. jurisdictions that provide for an oral hearing in
clemency proceedings.
144. See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 15 at 316.
145. Notification of the time of clemency deliberations and the final disposition of the
petition are required by Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of Jam., [2000] PC 35, and jurisdictions that follow
that decision. These are also required by international law. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Jamaica,
Case 12.023, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 41/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 ¶ 228
(2000); Edwards v. Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 48/01, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 (2000).
146. BARB. CONST. art. 78(5). This provision was added by constitutional amendment in
2002. Id.
147. BELIZE CONST. arts. 54(14), (18), (19).
148. ZIM. CONST. art. 47(4) (2013); see also ZIM. CONST. art. 31 (1979).
149. TUVALU CONST. art. 80(2).
150. Kathleen M. Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice or Mercy?, 24
CRIM. JUST. 26, 38 (2009–2010).
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pardon or parole board give a periodic report to the governor.151 In
Georgia, the board must report to the legislature.152 The strength of
this reporting requirement varies among U.S. states: in Massachu-
setts, the governor only needs to provide an annual list to the
legislature of pardons granted the previous year,153 while in Colo-
rado and Arkansas, the governor must report to the legislature the
reasons for granting a pardon.154 Pennsylvania’s constitution re-
quires that the pardons board shall keep records available for
public inspection.155 These reporting and publication requirements
allow some media and public scrutiny of clemency decisions.
At the U.S. federal level, the president’s pardon power does not
require that justifications or reasons be given for a pardon, though
notice of the decision is required.156 However, some observers have
argued that even though justification is not required, it would bene-
fit the pardon system.157 Detailed explanations for clemency usually
accompany only the most controversial pardons, such as the opin-
ion by President Clinton in The New York Times in 2001 justifying his
pardon a month earlier of Democratic Party donor Marc Rich.158
President Ford included a statement of reasons with his pardon of
Richard Nixon, as did George H.W. Bush with his pardon of the
defendants in the Iran-Contra scandal.159
These are the exceptions rather than the rule. The president or
the Pardon Attorney rarely explains grants or denials of clem-
ency.160 Justifications for clemency could help improve public
confidence in the quality of clemency decisions and force a clem-
ency authority to assess and evaluate the strength and
151. Dorne & Gewerthe, supra note 140, at 438.
152. Id.
153. Gavriel B. Wolfe, I Beg Your Pardon: A Call for Renewal of Executive Clemency and Ac-
countability in Massachusetts, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 417, 432 (2007).
154. Ernest Morris, Some Phases of the Pardoning Power, 12 A.B.A. J. 183, 187–88 (1926);
ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 18.
155. PENN. CONST. art. 4, § 9(b).
156. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.7, 1.8; Kobil, supra note 9, at 151–52 (noting that “detailed explana-
tions for clemency are certainly the exception rather than the rule”).
157. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 9, at 151.
158. See also William Jefferson Clinton, Opinion, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/opinion/my-reasons-for-the-par
dons.html?pagewanted=all.
159. President Gerald Ford, Remarks upon Signing a Proclamation Granting a Pardon to
Former President Richard Nixon (Sept. 8, 1974) in 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 207, 207–08
(2000–2001); President George Bush, Proclamation 6518 upon Granting Executive Clem-
ency to Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Others (Dec. 24, 1992) in 13
FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 209–10 (2000–2001).
160. See Kobil, supra note 9, at 151.
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persuasiveness of the justifications.161 Conversely, a transparency re-
quirement could discourage use of the clemency power and could
invite judicial scrutiny.162 One possibility for a middle ground would
be to require an executive to specify the charges being pardoned
without necessarily providing reasons for the pardon; this would fo-
cus the attention of the news media and allow inquiry into the
underlying crimes.163 Finding a compromise requirement could bal-
ance a clemency seeker’s interest in privacy (especially considering
the harsh collateral consequences of a criminal conviction), the
public’s interest in government transparency, and the victim’s inter-
est in preventing undeserved grants of clemency.
Too much transparency can work to an applicant’s detriment.
Louisiana’s process is unusually public: upon an application for
clemency, the Board of Pardons must give notice to the district at-
torney and the sheriff in the parish where the applicant was
convicted and to the injured victim or next-of-kin.164 All stakehold-
ers have the opportunity to testify at a clemency hearing.165 In
addition, the offender must advertise his petition for clemency
three times in a local newspaper.166 The sessions of the pardon
board are public and all recommendations for clemency may be
opened to public inspection, which may discourage public officials
from supporting clemency bids.167
Some jurisdictions have resolved the tension between public
transparency and a clemency seeker’s privacy interest in novel ways.
Love describes one interesting alternative: two parallel pardon
processes in South Dakota, where an applicant could make either a
direct application to the governor or an indirect one to the Board
of Pardons and Paroles.168 If a petitioner first seeks a recommenda-
tion from the Board and undergoes a public application process
and an open hearing, a pardon by the governor on the board’s rec-
ommendation seals the record of conviction and the pardon
itself.169 Since 2004, all clemency grants in South Dakota have been
through this alternative process.170 All of these state constitutional
161. Id. at 150.
162. Id. at 151–52.
163. See Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and Accountability in
the Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 1125, 1130 (1989).
164. Helen Ginger Berrigan, Executive Clemency, First-Offender Pardons; Automatic Restoration
of Rights, 62 LA. L. REV. 49 (2001).
165. Id. at 55–56 (citing LA. STAT. 15:572.4.).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Love, supra note 28, at 749–50.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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devices—mercy reports, hearings, and reporting and publication
requirements—help improve public confidence and may shield an
executive from a political backlash in the event of one “bad”
pardon.
IV. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND A ROLE FOR
COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS
The restorative justice movement has spurred a new critique of
executive clemency, namely that it is insensitive to victims by focus-
ing on the offender.171 Restorative justice refers to the array of non-
adversarial, reconciliatory mechanisms for dispute resolution that
emphasize the healing of the victims, families, and community after
trauma.172 Victims want an offender to own responsibility for harm
and feel genuine remorse, something that punishment alone may
not be able to deliver.173
This Part examines several constitutional clemency mechanisms
that promote restorative justice goals. First, provisions that seek
consideration or involvement by crime victims may serve restorative
goals, especially when such involvement is not directly adversarial to
the defendant and serves to promote reconciliation. In the U.S. fed-
eral clemency process, victims, families, and communities do not
necessarily play a formal role and may or may not be able to submit
their views.174 Second, a number of jurisdictions have special proce-
dures for claims based on actual innocence. At present, the Office
of the Pardon Attorney is poorly-suited to such claims, given the
171. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BECK, IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND DEATH
ROW FAMILIES 83–84 (2007) (describing how the clemency process is insensitive to the con-
cerns of families of death row inmates and the views of victims, especially where victims
oppose an execution); Austin Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Victims, Retribution,
and George Ryan’s Clemency, 82 N.C. L. REV., 1345, 1345–46 (2004).
172. Cathleen Burnett, Restorative Justice and Wrongful Capital Convictions, 21 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 272, 280–81 (2005); Rick Ruddell & L. Thomas Winfree, Setting Aside Criminal
Convictions in Canada: A Successful Approach to Offender Reintegration, 86 PRISON J. 452, 466 n.4
(2006); Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1415, 1419–20
(2004).
173. Weisberg, supra note 172 at 1419–20. See also Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tamper-
ing? Mercy and the Administration of Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 29–30
(Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussein eds. 2007).
174. Under the Office of the Pardon Attorney’s regulations, the Attorney General must
make reasonable effort to notify victims of a clemency petition if he determines that investi-
gation of the clemency case warrants contacting the victim, and he has the discretion to seek
the victim’s views, though this is not formally required. 28 C.F.R. § 1.6. However, the regula-
tions only reach victims who have suffered direct harm as the result of the crime for which
clemency is sought and who have a request for notice on file. See generally Deborah A. Deva-
ney, A Voice for Victims: What Prosecutors Can Add to the Clemency Process, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 163,
166 (2000–2001).
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lengthy waiting periods and the lack of a formal process for consid-
ering new evidence, including forensic evidence.175 Adopting a
decision-making process that is more receptive to such claims could
reinvigorate clemency as a tool for redressing wrongful convictions.
Finally, posthumous pardons, historically very rare at the U.S. fed-
eral level,176 may provide an opportunity to symbolically right an
historic injustice and promote community restoration.
Although victims do not play a formal role in United States fed-
eral clemency proceedings (though the Pardon Attorney can solicit
their views), other constitutional systems provide more formal
mechanisms for the involvement of victims.177 Under Kenya’s 2010
constitution, the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy “may
take into account the views of the victims of the offence” when de-
liberating on a recommendation to the president.178 Involving
victims in the clemency process not only serves restorative justice
goals, but may also provide political cover to an executive and
thereby encourage grants of clemency. Former Governor Bob Ehr-
lich of Maryland, for instance, sought input from victims before
granting a clemency application in order to neutralize political op-
position.179 As a frequent granter of clemency, this helps explain
why his clemency record was generally not controversial in his re-
election campaign.180
A second way the federal clemency process could serve the goals
of restorative justice and contribute to community and victim heal-
ing is through innocence pardons for wrongful convictions. Some
U.S. states have carved out a special clemency or pardon procedure
for claims based on actual innocence; these procedures usually ex-
empt such claims from waiting periods and other barriers and often
175. Hoffstadt, supra note 28, at 580–81.
176. Only two federal posthumous pardons have been granted in U.S. history. See STE-
PHEN GREENSPAN, POSTHUMOUS PARDONS GRANTED IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2011), http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/PosthumousPardons.pdf; NOVAK, supra note 15, at 94–95.
177. Above, I argued that one of the reasons for the decline of federal clemency in the
United States was control of the process largely by career prosecutors, who may be reluctant
to second-guess the determinations of prosecutors and judges as to the guilt or sentence of a
criminal defendant. Providing victims a “voice” in the clemency process may make the pro-
cess more adversarial and risks making a grant of clemency more difficult if one assumes that
victims oppose clemency in a given case. Some authors have asserted that prosecutors should
contribute to the clemency recommendation process precisely because prosecutors are in the
best place to protect the interests of victims. See, e.g., Devaney, supra note 174, at 166. None-
theless, receiving the views of prosecutors and victims in the clemency process is different
from prosecutorial influence or control over the process. Executive decision-making would
likely benefit from a diversity of views. Responding to prosecutorial and victim opinion may
improve the final decision and provide some political cover for difficult cases.
178. KENYA CONST. art. 133(4) (2010).
179. Barkow, supra note 28, at 155–56.
180. Id.
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restore a petitioner’s full rights.181 The waiting periods, limitations
on new evidence, and lack of a hearing make the Office of the Par-
don Attorney ill-suited to claims based on actual innocence.182
Implementing such a procedure is critical because the U.S. Su-
preme Court has identified clemency as the primary means of relief
in innocence cases where no procedural violation exists.183 A special
clemency process for claims based on actual innocence, such as re-
moving the five-year waiting period for filing a clemency
application and allowing formal consideration of new forensic (in-
cluding DNA) evidence,184 could make a restructured Office of the
Pardon Attorney more receptive and sensitive to such claims.
Several U.S. states provide examples of how the U.S. federal
clemency institution could effectively enact a special innocence par-
don process. The Constitution of Georgia exempts claims of actual
innocence from restrictions on the pardon power.185 According to
Georgia’s constitution, the legislature may prohibit the State Board
of Pardons and Paroles from granting pardons for twenty-five years
of a life sentence after commutation of a death sentence; for
mandatory minimum sentences or sentences without the possibility
of parole; for sentences of persons with prior convictions for the
same crime; and for consecutive life sentences.186 Claims of actual
innocence, however, are excluded from these restrictions.187 Simi-
larly, in Alabama, claims based on actual innocence are excluded
from the three year waiting period for seeking clemency, and in
Louisiana, applicants with a life sentence may avoid the fifteen year
waiting period if they have new evidence pertaining to actual inno-
cence.188 Some states also provide for an innocence-specific
clemency mechanism. In Montana, the pardons board specifically
permits pardon or commutation of sentence for claims based on
actual innocence, and an applicant may present new evidence to
181. Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and Innocence in
America, 51 CAL. W. L. REV. 55, 93–94 (2014) (citing GA. CONST. art. 4, ¶ II(b)–(c); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-9-39(d); ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(c); LA. STAT. ANN. §. 15:572; MONT. ADMIN. R.
20.25.901A(1)(a)).
182. Hoffstadt, supra note 28, at 580–81.
183. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 390–91 (1993).
184. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RULES GOVERNING PETI-
TIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY § 1.2 (2015).
185. GA. CONST. art. 4, § 2, ¶ II(e)
186. Id. at ¶ II(b)–(c)
187. Id. at ¶ II(e); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-39(d).
188. ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(c) (LexisNexis 2011); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.4D. See also
Cooper & Gough, supra note 181, at 92–95.
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the pardon authority.189 North Carolina provides for a specific “par-
don of innocence,”190 while Tennessee grants to the governor an
additional clemency power known as an “exoneration.”191 Both a
pardon of innocence and an exoneration expunge all criminal
records and restore all rights of citizenship.192 The Texas Board of
Pardons and Parole similarly has the ability to grant a “pardon of
innocence” upon evidence of actual innocence from the trial judge,
prosecutor, sheriff, or habeas corpus proceeding in state court.193 A
clemency application process specifically for innocence cases at the
federal level (for instance, exempting them from the five-year wait-
ing period) could make federal clemency an effective tool for cases
of wrongful convictions.
Finally, the posthumous pardon is a third restorative justice
mechanism that could benefit the communities and families of a
convicted person and thereby promotes restorative justice goals:
breaking cycles of revenge, promoting community harmony, and
encouraging resolution of future problems.194 Governments around
the world have used the posthumous pardon to great effect in his-
torically controversial innocence cases.195 No constitution in the
common law world specifically makes provisions for posthumous
pardons, but such pardons existed in pre-modern England.196 Pos-
thumous pardons are still occasionally used to right wrongful
convictions. In 1966, the British government granted a posthumous
pardon for Timothy Evans, who was wrongfully executed in 1950
for the murders of his daughter and wife.197 Three years later, one
of the prosecution witnesses confessed to the murders and was
hanged in 1953.198
Posthumous pardons carry important symbolism in cases tainted
by discrimination. In 2010, Canada gave its first posthumous par-
don in history to Viola Desmond, a black woman jailed for
defrauding the government by one penny when she sat in a whites-
189. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.901A(1)(a).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-149 (2013).
191. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (2015).
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-149 (2013) (providing for expungement); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-27-109 (2015) (providing for expungement and restoration of citizenship rights).
193. TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUSTICE, PARDON FOR INNOCENCE, www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/forms/
PFI%20App.pdf (last revised Jan. 11, 2010).
194. Steiker, supra note 173 at 29.
195. See infra, notes 200–216 and accompanying text.
196. See J.G. Simms, County Sligo in the Eighteenth Century, 91 ROYAL SOC’Y ANTIQUARIES 153,
154 (1961) (discussing example of a posthumous pardon in premodern England).
197. Bernie Matthews, Australian Miscarriages of Justice, 10 NAT’L LEGAL EAGLE 15, 15
(2004).
198. Id.
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only section of a movie theater in protest of the theater’s segrega-
tion policy.199 In addition, a controversial campaign is underway for
a posthumous pardon for Louis Riel, a Métis rebel leader hanged
for treason in Canada in 1885.200 Métis leaders and the Riel family
oppose such a pardon because they do not believe that he commit-
ted any crime at all, a flash point in Canada’s relationship with
Quebec and with First Nations leaders.201 In what may confirm a
broader Commonwealth trend, Nigeria and Australia have also
granted posthumous pardons.202  Posthumous pardons have sym-
bolic power, and for this reason they can both right historical
injustice and perpetuate historical controversy.
Posthumous pardons may help right historical injustices. In 2013,
after a multiyear campaign, the Queen granted a royal pardon to
Alan Turing, the World War Two codebreaker who committed sui-
cide after his 1952 conviction for “gross indecency” and
homosexual acts.203 Following the Turing pardon, gay rights advo-
cates called for posthumous pardons for all 49,000 men convicted
under Britain’s anti-sodomy laws.204 Perhaps the largest posthu-
mous pardon was the 2006 mass pardon for 306 soldiers in the
British Army during World War One who were “shot at dawn” for
199. In Rare Posthumous Pardon, Nova Scotia Apologizes for Black Woman’s 1946 Arrest, GLOBE
& MAIL, Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/in-rare-posthu
mous-pardon-nova-scotia-apologizes-for-black-womans-1946-arrest/article4315080; PREMIER’S
OFFICE, Late Viola Desmond Granted Apology, Free Pardon (Apr. 15, 2010), http://novascotia.ca/
news/smr/2010-04-15-pardon.asp.
200. Jean Teillet, Exoneration for Louis Riel: Mercy, Justice, or Political Expediency?, 67 SASK. L.
REV. 359, 359–60 (2004).
201. Id.
202. In Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan pardoned several coup plotters, including
a former vice president who died in prison and a former military governor who died in a car
accident, which allowed them to posthumously receive their pensions for their ranks in the
Nigerian armed forces. Festus Owete, Nigerians Condemn Pardons for Alamieyesegha, Bulama,
PREMIUM TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/124411-nigerians-
condemn-pardon-for-alamieyesegha-bulama.html; How Pardon was Granted to Alamieyeseigha,
Others, THIS DAY, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/how-pardon-was-gran
ted-to-alamieyeseigha-others/142114; Bayo Oladeji, State Pardon: Yar-Adua, Diya, Others Get
N1.01 Billion as Benefits, LEADERSHIP (Mar. 18, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/20130318
0345.html.  In what is believed to be Australia’s first posthumous pardon, the Governor of
Victoria pardoned Colin Campbell Ross, a wine bar owner executed in 1922 for the sensa-
tional “gun alley murder” in Melbourne. Modern forensic evidence showed that he was
innocent.  John Silvester, Ross Cleared of Murder Nearly 90 Years Ago, THE AGE (May 27, 2008),
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/05/26/1211653938453.html.
203. UK Grants Posthumous Pardon to World War II Code-Breaker Alan Turing, INDIAN EXPRESS
(Dec. 25, 2013, 12:21 AM), http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/uk-grants-posthumous-
pardon-to-world-war-ii-codebreaker-alan-turing/1211378.
204. Emma Margolin, Petition Calls for Pardon of 49,000 Men Prosecuted Under UK Anti-Sod-
omy Law, MSNBC, (Feb. 23, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/petition-calls-
pardon-49000-men-prosecuted-under-anti-sodomy-law.
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cowardice or desertion.205 Among these was Private Henry Farr,
shot at dawn for cowardice on October 16, 1916, after he refused to
go to the front line, exhibiting symptoms of shell shock or what
would later be termed post-traumatic stress disorder.206 Historical
and academic inquiries into the “shot at dawn” soldiers fed a public
campaign that garnered press attention and spawned letter-writing
campaigns, spreading to Ireland, Canada, Scotland, and New Zea-
land.207 Farr was the first British soldier pardoned in August 2006;
the other 305 soldiers were pardoned in November that year.208 A
blanket pardon was controversial because it implied censure of
those attempting to administer justice on the front lines. In addi-
tion, it is certain from the extant records that not all of those shot
at dawn suffered from shell shock, and is likely that only a small
proportion of them did.209 Nonetheless, some injustice was undeni-
able, and today the shot at dawn soldiers are treated as war victims
and not as criminals.
The United States has historically not granted posthumous par-
dons at the federal level. Only two have been granted to date. In
February 1999, President Bill Clinton granted the first posthumous
presidential pardon in American history to Lieutenant Henry Os-
sian Flipper, the only African-American in the commissioned
officer corps, who was dismissed from the army in 1881 after a
court-martial for conduct unbecoming an officer.210 Flipper’s de-
scendants had criticized the U.S. Pardon Attorney’s policy of not
granting posthumous pardons.211 In 2008, President George W.
Bush pardoned Charles Winters, who served 18 months in prison
after providing three military aircraft to Israel in the late 1940s,
helping to ensure the newly-independent country’s survival in the
wars that followed.212
The President can learn from the states in the posthumous par-
don context because the states have much longer histories in
granting posthumous pardons than the federal government. In
205. Ben Fenton, Pardoned: The 306 Soldiers Shot at Dawn for ‘Cowardice,’ THE TELEGRAPH,
(Aug. 16, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1526437/Pardoned-the-306-
soldiers-shot-at-dawn-for-cowardice.html.
206. Simon Wessely, The Life and Death of Henry Farr, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y. MED. 440, 440
(2006).
207. Douglas C. Peifer, The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in
the German and British Pardon Campaigns, 71 J. MIL. HIST. 1107, 1111–19 (2007).
208. Id.
209. David Sharp, Shocked, Shot, and Pardoned, 368 LANCET 975, 975–76 (2006).
210. Darryl W. Jackson et al., Bending Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon of Lieutenant
Henry Ossian Flipper, 75 IND. L.J. 1251, 1251–53 (1999).
211. Id.
212. Greenspan, supra note 177.
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1893, the governor of Illinois made one of the first posthumous
pardons in American history when he pardoned the eight defend-
ants convicted of inciting the 1886 Haymarket Square riot due to
fair trial concerns.213  Five of the eight pardons were posthumously
issued for the four defendants executed for the crime and one who
committed suicide the day of the execution.214 In 1977, Massachu-
setts Governor Michael Dukakis pardoned Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti, Italian immigrants infamously executed fol-
lowing an unfair trial.215 Posthumous pardons have even been
granted in states where the pardon power is held by an indepen-
dent board or where the governor and the board share the power.
Because of advances in forensic technology, especially DNA evi-
dence, posthumous pardons are issued more frequently than in
prior decades for crimes ranging from obscenity convictions of en-
tertainers to wartime sedition and cases with racial overtones.216
For clemency to play a role in a system of restorative justice,
clemency must mean more than simply declining to carry out a de-
served punishment out of compassion for an offender; rather, it
must include a role for victims and communities in order to bring
about reconciliation.217  In addition, creating a special procedure
for claims of actual innocence, such as exempting such claims from
mandatory waiting periods, could transform the federal clemency
process into a tool to address the problem of wrongful convictions.
Finally, the selective use of posthumous pardons can provide sym-
bolically important redress for historical controversies and injustice.
All three clemency proposals could play a role in a restorative jus-
tice approach to criminal justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Pardon reform at the federal level in the United States has at-
tracted considerable scholarly attention, but comparative
213. Id. at 6.
214. Charlie Gofen, Haymarket Riot Remembered, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 1987, http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-11-09/news/8703240258_1_haymarket-riot-modern-uni
ons-bloody-riot.
215. Greenspan, supra note 212, at 6.
216. Id. at 3–10.  In 2013, Alabama’s parole board granted a posthumous pardon to the
Scottsboro boys, nine African-American teenagers falsely accused and convicted of raping
two white women on a train. The legislature unanimously passed the Scottsboro Boys Act
earlier that year to allow the State Board of Pardons and Parole to issue posthumous pardons,
exempting them from notification, waiting, and publication requirements defined in Ala-
bama law. See Alan Blinder, Alabama Pardons 3 “Scottsboro Boys” After 80 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2013, at A14; S.B. 97 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013).
217. Steiker, supra note 173 at 29.
SUMMER 2016] Global Lessons For Pardon Reform 851
perspectives are lacking despite the near-universal recognition of
executive clemency as a crucial tool of criminal justice reform.218 In
the United States, the current federal clemency process is a bureau-
cratic, opaque process controlled by career prosecutors in the
Department of Justice.219 Looking to other jurisdictions in the com-
mon law world, this Article identified a number of constitutional
and policy innovations that may promote transparency in the fed-
eral clemency process.
First, the creation of an advisory committee of experts drawn
from civil society, medical fields, corrections, and academia could
broaden the range of views in the deliberation process. The domi-
nant model of clemency decision-making in the common law world
is an independent advisory committee structure rather than a
closed bureaucracy. Additionally, the United States stands largely
outside of a global trend toward opening the clemency process to
judicial and administrative scrutiny, even in death penalty cases
where the risks are greatest. The application of FOIA to Depart-
ment of Justice clemency proceedings, however, is a welcome
development that could improve the decision-making process. This
Article also considered a range of reporting and publication re-
quirements that could guide media and public inquiries, especially
where pardons occur before a criminal investigation is carried out
or a trial record is developed. Finally, this Article turned to policy
innovations that address one of the most persistent critiques of the
clemency process: insensitivity to victims, families, and communi-
ties. No single clemency structure can completely resolve the
competing interests of victims, the public, the justice system, and
the clemency-seeker. A comparative constitutional analysis of the
pardon power confirms a growing global trend toward transparency
and accountability in the clemency process and offers a rich array
of options for improving the quality of executive decision-making.
218. Rachel Barkow makes the case for clemency, arguing that the process allows individ-
ualization of sentences, especially where punishments are mandatory; serves as a safety valve
for contentious cases or cases of possible innocence; and draws attention to systemic failings
in the criminal justice system.  Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1360–61, 1364–65 (2008).
219. Love, supra note 35, at 192.
